Publications
A Moral Theory of Public Service Motivation (Frontiers in Psychology 2020, 11.)
with Tse-Min Wang and Arjen van Witteloostuijn
Abstract:
Morality constructs the relationship between the self and others, providing a sense of appropriateness that facilitates and coordinates social behaviors. We start from Moral Foundation Theory (MFT), and argue that multiple moral domains can shape the meaning of public service and engender Public Service Motivation (PSM). From the lens of cognitive science, we develop a causal map for PSM by understanding the social cognition process underlying PSM, focusing on five innate moralities as the potential antecedents of PSM: Care, Fairness, Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity. Extending moral domains beyond compassion and justice can provide a disaggregated view of PSM, which may help to identify institutional and cultural variation in the meaning of PSM. We discuss the theoretical implications of synthesizing MFT and PSM literatures, and provide directions for future research that could improve our understanding of PSM.
with Tse-Min Wang and Arjen van Witteloostuijn
Abstract:
Morality constructs the relationship between the self and others, providing a sense of appropriateness that facilitates and coordinates social behaviors. We start from Moral Foundation Theory (MFT), and argue that multiple moral domains can shape the meaning of public service and engender Public Service Motivation (PSM). From the lens of cognitive science, we develop a causal map for PSM by understanding the social cognition process underlying PSM, focusing on five innate moralities as the potential antecedents of PSM: Care, Fairness, Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity. Extending moral domains beyond compassion and justice can provide a disaggregated view of PSM, which may help to identify institutional and cultural variation in the meaning of PSM. We discuss the theoretical implications of synthesizing MFT and PSM literatures, and provide directions for future research that could improve our understanding of PSM.
Reward and punishment in a team contest (PLOS ONE 2020, 15(9).)
with Martin Strobel
Abstract:
A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other team members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment: One in which two teams compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the contest. We find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the team contest. Furthermore, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing.
with Martin Strobel
Abstract:
A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other team members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment: One in which two teams compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the contest. We find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the team contest. Furthermore, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing.
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To Tender or Not to Tender? Deliberate and Exogenous Sunk Costs in a Public Good Game (Games 2018, 9, 41.)
with Martin Sefton
Abstract:
In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control setup. As such, both groups of players incur sunk costs and enter the public good game with different wealth levels. Our results indicate that the way these sunk costs have been accrued matters especially for groups on the losing side of the contest: Given the same level of sunk costs, contributions to the public good are lower for groups which failed to be successful in the preceding between-group contest. Furthermore, this detrimental effect is more pronounced for individuals who play a contest with deliberate contributions before.
with Martin Sefton
Abstract:
In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control setup. As such, both groups of players incur sunk costs and enter the public good game with different wealth levels. Our results indicate that the way these sunk costs have been accrued matters especially for groups on the losing side of the contest: Given the same level of sunk costs, contributions to the public good are lower for groups which failed to be successful in the preceding between-group contest. Furthermore, this detrimental effect is more pronounced for individuals who play a contest with deliberate contributions before.
| Presentation Slides |
Contests for Public Goods (Doctoral Thesis 2017)
Abstract:
Competitive situations are ubiquitous in society. From international conflicts for resources to the daily competition for clients, a finite amount of wealth (and attention) has to be allotted between stakeholders. This happens on various layers of society and with different degrees of hostility. Using the controlled environment of laboratory experiments, I investigate the role of fundamental institutions in situations where groups compete for a prize of fixed or endogenous size.
My research has shown that in a competitive environment, groups oftentimes do not use interaction mechanisms to coordinate towards a more efficient outcome. Instead, participants incentivise their teammates to pursue a more aggressive strategy to outdo the opposing group, beyond a financially prudent level of appropriation
Abstract:
Competitive situations are ubiquitous in society. From international conflicts for resources to the daily competition for clients, a finite amount of wealth (and attention) has to be allotted between stakeholders. This happens on various layers of society and with different degrees of hostility. Using the controlled environment of laboratory experiments, I investigate the role of fundamental institutions in situations where groups compete for a prize of fixed or endogenous size.
My research has shown that in a competitive environment, groups oftentimes do not use interaction mechanisms to coordinate towards a more efficient outcome. Instead, participants incentivise their teammates to pursue a more aggressive strategy to outdo the opposing group, beyond a financially prudent level of appropriation
| Presentation Slides |
Working Papers
Moral Foundations in Government Communication and Vaccine Hesitancy
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Conflict and Migration
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Paper coming soon
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Let's (not) escalate this!
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Foreign Language Use in Competition vs. Cooperation
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